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Abstract
The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic en-
vironment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property
rights to land. The political economy literature has modelled the endogenous de-
termination of property rights. In this paper we propose a model in which the
economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the
distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the
form of organization may aﬀect the probability and distribution of bene￿ts from
agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model
oﬀers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic advantages has been so little
used in countries where agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We argue that
this in particular helps to understand the dearth of tenancy and the relative failure
of land reform in Latin America.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The study of the nature and determinants of agrarian organization is one of the oldest
topics in economics and the system of metayage, or sharecropping, was discussed by
Adam Smith, J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall. A dominant theme in the modern literature1
is that contractual arrangements and ownership patterns are determined by the incentive
problems that arise when labor eﬀort or other relevant production actions are diﬃcult to
observe, or costly to monitor. Theory tells us that a whole class of such incentive problems
can be solved, or at least ameliorated, by renting or selling the ￿rm to the agent since
residual claimant status better aligns the agent￿s objectives with those of the production
enterprise.
A successful theory of agrarian organization ought to be able to account for the large
diﬀerences across countries and continents, and evolution over time. For example, in the
absence of scale economies, this theory predicts that total land area under tenancy should
be higher in areas where land is more unequally distributed, as land lease markets ought
to reallocate land from relatively land abundant households. While actual comparisons of
aggregate tenancy patterns across regions are complicated by agro-climate and technolog-
ical considerations, we nonetheless should expect a relatively lower incidence of tenancy
in regions like Asia where land inequality has been historically low (particularly after mid
20th century land reforms in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). Contrariwise, we
would expect a relatively high fraction of cultivated land to be organized under tenancy
in Latin America where land inequality has been extremely high.
That this is evidently not the case can be seen clearly in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1, which
is adapted from Hayami and Otsuka￿s (1993; Table 1.1) survey of agricultural contracts,
indicates important diﬀerences in the use of tenancy across regions. In a sample of twelve
European countries for which comparable data was available over 40 percent of cultivated
land in 1970 was farmed under pure tenancy on land cultivated by owners who also leased
land. In the United States and Canada the comparable ￿gure was over 60 percent.2 For
1Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz (1974) are early examples of this approach. Literature surveys include
Bardhan (1989), Bardhan and Udry (1999), Basu (1997) and Hayami and Otsuka (1993).
2These ￿gures somewhat overestimate the actual extent of tenancy because they cannot distinguish
between owned and leased land operated by owner-cum-tenants. Recent ￿gures from the 1997 US Agri-
cultural Census help clarify this distinction however, by indicating that approximately 53 percent of land
operated by owner-cum-tenants was leased land. This leads to an estimate that approximately 49% of
harvested cropland in the United States was cultivated under leased land. Assuming the same ratio held
1a sample of ten Asian countries, approximately 16 percent of land was under tenancy. As
Table 2 indicates however that prior to experiencing land reforms, countries such as Korea,
Japan and Taiwan had tenancy rates close to or above 50 percent. Latin America stands
out in sharp contrast to these other regions: despite having by far the most concentrated
land ownership pattern, and fewer laws to regulate tenancy contracts, less than 12 percent
of cultivated land was under tenancy in 1970.
Such diﬀerences across regions cannot be accounted for using existing microeconomic
theories except by assuming that fundamental diﬀerences in market structures or infor-
mation removed the advantages of tenancy in Latin America. Yet this is not self-evidently
plausible.3 Another potential explanation is that agro-climate or technological considera-
tions dictate that crops in Latin America are subject to greater scale economies. But this
too seems to fall short of a complete explanation for several reasons. First, the fraction of
cultivable land under plantation agriculture subject to technological economies of scale is
not large enough to explain the magnitude of the observed diﬀerences, except for certain
countries and regions (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000). More importantly, comparisons of
agrarian organization on a crop by crop basis also reveal the relative paucity of tenancy
arrangements in Latin America compared to other parts. Finally, arguing that economies
of scale explains the diﬀerence seems to lead down the wrong path because the highest ex-
tent of tenancy is found in North America where heavy mechanization might be expected
to make economies of scale important.
In this paper we present a political economy theory of agrarian organization which can
help account for these facts. The modern literature has stressed the economic environment
as the key determinant of agrarian structure. In doing so, however, it has assumed
that property rights are secure. Yet, property rights over land have been contested and
rede￿ned in almost all agrarian societies, and land reform has been one of the burning
political issues of the past century (Moore, 1965; Binswanger et. al, 1995). Although
land reform has at times taken place in revolutionary contexts, for example in Mexico,
China, or Cuba, a larger number of reforms have been implemented or attempted in the
context, or anticipation of, normal electoral competition. In Latin America important
for the data of Table 1, then approximately 40 percent of cultivated land in North America was under
tenancy in 1970.
3Theories that appeal to credit market imperfections (e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986, Banerjee and
Newman, 1993, Legros and Newman, 1996) or to the uneven distribution of non-traded skills may account
for why ￿xed rent tenancy may not be more prevalent amongst the poor in a given time period, and these
are surely important factors in Latin America. But these theories do not account for why the distribution
of talent or ￿nance should have remained so fundamentally diﬀerent across regions over such long periods
of time (Carter and Zimmerman, 2000).
2attempts at land reforms followed democratization in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela (Lapp, 1997).4 Property rights are
the endogenous outcome of collective political choices and a striking diﬀerence between
Latin America and Western Europe or Asia in the 20th century, is the extent to which
property rights have been perceived to be stable and secure in the rural sector. These
facts suggest that agrarian structure could itself be aﬀected, not just by the economic
environment, but also by the way in which property rights are determined and sustained.5
We propose a model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political
equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. We
identify a relationship between agrarian organization and the net bene￿ts that agents can
expect via politically mediated land reform. Speci￿cally, tenants may acquire skills, or
de facto property rights from squatting, which increase their potential gains under land
reform. This tends to increase its extent through the political system. In anticipation of
this, however, and despite possible economic bene￿ts of tenancy, landlords may choose to
limit the extent of tenancy in order to increase the stability of their property rights. By
limiting tenancy landlords undermine squatting rights and slow skill accumulation in ways
that may limit the extent of land reform and the threat of expropriation. In section 3 we
document the importance of this mechanism for helping to account for the paradoxical
dearth of tenancy within Latin America￿s landlord estates.
Nevertheless, as the conventional wisdom predicts and the Tables indicate, tenancy
is the prevalent institution in many parts of the world. Moreover, agrarian reforms have
taken place in situations where tenancy was once dominant, as the important examples
Japan, Korea and Taiwan illustrate, and tenancy reforms have been important through-
out Europe. Why should tenancy have been particularly threatening to landlords in Latin
America? Why did the forces that led to low tenancy in Latin America not operate in
East Asia and Europe? Our model suggests at least three reasons: (1) factor endow-
ments, pre-reform land inequality and competition; (2) higher basic education increases
the opportunity cost of restricting tenancy; and (3) how land reform emerges as a national
political issue.
Table 2 shows pre-land reform land concentration and tenancy for selected countries
for which data is available. The ￿rst comparative static result of our model suggests that
4Political reforms that extended voting rights to tenants and small farmers also led to signi￿cant
changes in tenancy regulation and land taxation in a large number of European countries (Swinnen,
2000).
5By this we do not just mean the well known eﬀects of the instability of property rights on investment
(Besley, 1995).
3in countries where per capita land inequality is highest, there is a greater incentive to
challenge property rights via the political system, and this makes landlords more likely to
organize agriculture in a politically defensive manner, by limiting tenancy. This suggests
that one reason why tenancy is less threatening to landlords in Western Europe or North
America is that land is much more equally distributed. All else equal, the model also
suggests that Latin America￿s historically higher land-to-labor ratio has also acted to
increase the political risk of land reform.
Result (2) suggests that diﬀerential human capital attainment might also help explain
the relative incidence of tenancy. In our model human capital may raise the economic
bene￿ts of tenancy relative to its political cost, suggesting another reason why we are
more likely to observe tenancy in the Asian context, or in countries such as Argentina
and Uruguay which have long lead the continent in educational achievement.
How land reform emerges as a national political issue may also determine landlords￿
production organization decisions. Within Latin America, in situations where land reform
has not become an important political issue, we ought to see a greater extent of tenancy.
This appears to be the case in countries like Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Uruguay
stands out for having both a very high land Gini, and the highest extent of tenancy of
the six countries listed in Table 2. Argentina has also been noted for its relatively high
tenancy rates (Taylor, 1997). Yet in both of these countries, political cleavages have
never coalesced around the issue of agrarian reform, but instead around the urban-rural
dichotomy. As a result, land reform has not been a national political issue because the
political parties were more interested in redistributing between the urban and rural sectors
rather than within the latter.6 Chile is an interesting intermediate case where an urban-
rural cleavage temporarily gave way to a rich-poor cleavage after 1958 and a short-lived
opening for land reform.
Another important instance where result (3) sheds light on agrarian structure is in
East Asia. Land reforms that aﬀected Taiwan, Korea and Japan, each occurred in the
context of actual or threatened external invasion which were unanticipated events that
undermined previously dominant landlord classes whose authority had previously been
unchallenged. However, as soon as the political basis for these property rights was un-
dermined, the existence of a large population of tenants assured strong political support
for far reaching land reforms, as the case of Korea described below clearly attests. The
6This seems to have been the case both in Argentina where the urban Peronist coalition redistributed
to itself away from the rural sector (see O￿Donnell, 1979). Similarly, in Uruguay, the split was between
the urban Colorados and the rural Blancos (Collier and Collier, 1991, Chapter 5).
4fact that land reform arose in an unanticipated manner meant that landlords had not
organized production to avoid this, and this led to large reforms since tenants were able
to eﬀectively use redistributed land. In Latin America reforms were more often de-
railed, limited or reversed by the politically defensive actions of landlords. Furthermore,
were land reforms did take place the disorganization costs were often high as land was
transferred to households with more limited farm management experience.
Our paper is related to several literatures. The connection between the anticipation of
land reform and defensive patterns of agrarian organization has been discussed and amply
documented by many scholars including Palacios (1979), de Janvry (1981), Le Grand
(1986), Zamosc (1986), and Binswanger et. al. (1995) amongst others. Nevertheless
none of these studies provides an explicit mechanism linking the two issues, nor do they
fully explain in comparative perspective why land reform should become a political issue
in some countries rather than others or why agrarian organization diﬀers so much even
where land reform had become a salient political issue. This is a major contribution of
our analysis and a key for understanding the relative eﬃciency of land reforms.
As we noted above, our paper is the ￿rst to depart from the standard approach to
agrarian structure by emphasizing the role played by the political, rather than the eco-
nomic, environment. Several models, for example Grossman (1993), Horowitz (1993),
and Acemoglu and Robinson (1999), have examined the incentive to redistribute land
as a way of forestalling social con￿ict or revolution.7 Our model diﬀers in focusing on
non-revolutionary politics and studying the joint determination of land reform and the
organization of production. This allows us to derive new comparative results regarding
the incidence and success of reform. Finally, our research is related to a large political
economy literature which has stressed how ineﬃcient decisions may arise to manipulate
future political equilibria. This research includes Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina
and Tabellini (1990), Aghion and Bolton (1990), and Besley and Coate (1998) in the
context of democratic politics, and Robinson (1998) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)
in non-democratic polities. Apart from the diﬀerent focus and motivation of our analysis,
the fundamental theoretical diﬀerence is that in our model it is private agents and not
political decisionmakers who take actions that aﬀect subsequent political outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic
model and analyses comparative static results of the political-economic equilibrium that
7This view has evidently also in￿uenced policymakers and military strategists who have often placed
land reform at the center of counterinsurgency plans in countries from Vietnam to El Salvador (Proster-
man and Reidinger, 1987; Prosterman et al., 1990).
5it implies. Section 3 discusses a number of historical episodes that appear to be consistent
with the interpretations given here and Section 4 concludes.
2E l e m e n t s o f a M o d e l
2.1 Fundamentals
We consider a two period economy. In the ￿rst period the distribution of land is given and
the organization of agriculture is determined for both periods. At the start of the second
p e r i o dt h e r ei sa ne l e c t i o nw h e r et w oo ﬃce motivated political parties compete for power
by oﬀering to redistribute land.8 The outcome of this electoral competition determines
the equilibrium amount of land reform. After the election, land reform is implemented
and second period production takes place.
There are three types of agents. In the rural sector there is a mass λ
L of ￿landlords￿
and a mass λ
P are ￿peasants.￿ The urban sector has a mass of agents of measure λ
U.W e
adopt the normalization that λ
L+λ
P +λ
U =1 . Each agent tries to maximize the sum of
consumption over the two periods and there is no discounting. All agents also gain utility
from whichever political party is in power (their ￿ideological preferences￿) which will be
important subsequently in determining the outcome of the election.
We shall model the urban sector in a reduced form way and assume that all agents
there have an exogenous endowment income of y. All production and resource allocation
therefore takes place in the rural sector. In the rural sector of the economy, there is an
endowment of T units of land initially divided between landlords and peasants. Each
agent in the rural economy is also exogenously endowed with h units of human capital.
We assume that θ is the proportion of total land owned by the landlords so that each
landlord holds θT/λ
L while each peasant has (1 − θ)T/λ
P units of land. Naturally, we












There is a single consumption good which is numeraire with price normalized to unity.
The good is produced in the rural sector using capital and labor according to the constant
returns to scale production function, F(T,L)=s(t,h)(T + L).H e r es(t,h) is total factor
productivity which in turn depends on two accumulated factors. Firstly, it depends on
8Our political model is closely related to the probabilistic voting model of Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
6peasant skill which is in turn assumed to rise with average farming experience and hence
with t ∈ [0,1], the amount of land that a landlord places under tenancy in the previous
period. To keep things simple we assume that t represents the fraction of land worked as
a tenant by each peasant so that all peasants are identical and there is no heterogeneity
between peasants who were or were not tenants in the ￿rst period. Secondly, h is the
exogenous stock of human capital of each worker. We assume that sh > 0, shh < 0,
st > 0, stt < 0 and that tenancy and human capital are Edgeworth complements so
that sth > 0. The assumption of a linear production captures the idea that tenancy has
bene￿cial economic eﬀects in the simplest possible way.9
By determining the extent of tenancy in the ￿rst period landlords aﬀect skill accumu-
lation, and hence productivity in the second period. For convenience only, we normalize
￿rst period t to zero and write the productivity level s(0,h).
2.2 Political institutions
Potential asset redistributions are mediated through the political process. We shall model
society￿s choice regarding the possibility and extent of land reform as being the outcome
of electoral competition. To ￿xi d e a s ,w e￿rst analyze the case of electoral competition
within the context of a probabilistic voting model, but then explain how the essential
trade-oﬀs of the model would be adapted to other models of political competition.
Assume that there is one vote per-agent in the economy. Two political parties, which
we denote A and B compete for these votes. In this section we assume that both parties
have the sole objective of maximizing the probability of winning the election. We assume
that there is a single policy issue or instrument which is the proportion of land, denoted
α ∈ [0,1], to be taken from the landlords and divided equally between the peasants. We
assume, however, that it is costly to redistribute land. To redistribute a proportion α
clearly costs landlords in terms of lost assets and reduced income but we also assume that
land reform imposes cost C(α) on each landlord, peasant and urban agent. Here C is
strictly increasing and convex with C(0) = 0, C0 > 0, C00 > 0 and C000 ≤ 0.10 Clearly,
9In an earlier draft we modeled farming skill s(t,h) as a non-traded production factor in a more general
constant or diminishing returns to scale production function F(T,L,s(t,h)). Suppressing tenancy then
not only slowed skill accumulation as in the linear model, but also, depending on the assumed market
structure, could produce within period allocative ineﬃciencies. The linear model was adopted to vastly
simplify the comparative static analysis while retaining the essential insights.
10The assumption that urban agents incur costs from land reform captures the idea that the costs of
agrarian reform spill over into the cities. This could be because the government raises taxes to ￿nance
reforms, because reform induces higher food prices, or perhaps because focusing policy on the rural sector
has opportunity costs in terms of spending in the urban sector.
7since neither landlords nor urban voters bene￿t from the redistribution of land, but both
bear costs, they strictly prefer α =0 .11 Peasants however potentially prefer α > 0.T h e
equilibrium extent of land reform therefore depends on how the political system aggregates
the preferences of diﬀerent agents.
Let V g(αx) be the indirect utility of an agent of group g ∈ {L,P,U} as a function
of the extent of land reform oﬀered by party x ∈ {A,B}. W ea s s u m et h a te a c ha g e n t
receives an aggregate ideological shock in favor of party B of δ and also an individual
speci￿cs h o c ko fσig. Thus an agent of group g votes for party A if the indirect utility
he gets from the policy platform of party A is greater than the indirect utility from the


















. We can therefore calculate the critical value of the idiosyncratic shock





All agents of group g with σig ≤ b σig vote for party A. The total number of agents in
group g that vote for party A is therefore,
λ
g













This follows because, for given δ, A gets the votes of all the agents of a group who have
low values of σig. The probability that party A wins the election, denoted χ(αA,αB),i s




































11W ea r er u l i n go u tt h ec a s eo fα < 0 or ￿land grabs￿ where landlords seize peasant land, although there
is nothing in principle to rule this out. For example, late19th century Liberal reforms in several Latin
American republics privatized communal lands leading in several cases to large scale transfers of land to
landlords.


















g. The probability of winning is a simple weighted sum of the utility
diﬀerences that the policy platforms of the parties induce.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium between the parties is a pair of platforms (e αA, e αB),
such that




e αB =a r g m a x
αB∈[0,1]
1 − χ(e αA,αB).
By symmetry, a Nash equilibrium between the parties involves e αA = e αB = e α,w h e r ee α






=0 .( 2 )
where ηg = λ
gφ
g. This ￿rst order condition can be easily seen to be a weighted average of
the ￿rst-order conditions that determine the preferred policy of each group. The weight
ηg given to each group￿s preferences is proportional to that group￿s population share of the
vote but is also aﬀected by φ
g, which is the density of the ideological shocks σig. The larger
is φ






and hence the more ideologically homogenous
is group g. Groups with relatively larger φ
g will have more in￿uence in determining the
equilibrium policy put forward by political parties because such groups will contain more
￿swing voters,￿ or voters who are less likely to be individualistically swayed by ideology
or other super￿cial candidate characteristics, and more likely to vote in line with their
common economic interests. Thus candidates tilt their platforms toward the policies
desired by these groups.
Many other models of political competition boil down to an equilibrium condition such
as (2). For example, the simplest median voter model assigns ηg =1to the median voter
group and ηg =0to all other groups. As discussed below interesting equilibria with a
positive probability of land reform will arise within the context of this simple probabilistic
voting model only when the peasant group can achieve suﬃcient ￿political clout￿ to attract
the attention of political candidates. More generally, land reform will emerge within any
political system that gives suﬃcient political weight ηP to the peasant sector￿s preferences.
92.3 Structure of Payoﬀs
The key interaction in the model is the eﬀect of the organization of agriculture on the
extent of land reform determined by the political equilibrium. To keep things as simple
as possible, the fraction of land kept under tenancy in the ￿rst period will not aﬀect
current output, but does aﬀect total factor productivity in the second period. Since
st > 0 it is clearly socially eﬃcient to set t =1 .H o w e v e r , a s w e s h a l l s h o r t l y s h o w ,
this is typically not an equilibrium because tenancy, by increasing the productivity of
land in the second period, may simultaneously undermine landlords￿ property rights by
increasing the attractiveness of land reform. Thus the higher is t the greater the extent
of land redistribution that the political parties will oﬀer. This reduces the incentive to
landlords to set high t.
Landlord production organization decisions may be aﬀected by the anticipation of re-
form, whether or not landlords internalize how their actions might in￿uence the political
equilibrium. For example individual landlords might limit the extent of tenancy for fear of
a land-to-the-tiller land reform and the aggregate eﬀect of their uncoordinated decisions
will aﬀect the probability or extent of such reforms. In this paper we assume landlords do
internalize how their actions to try to aﬀect the future political equilibrium. When this is
the case it seems reasonable to also assume that landlords understand how their actions
in￿uence market prices. Under the assumed linear production technology this assumption
is without consequence however because current period marginal factor products are un-
aﬀected by current production decisions. Hence factor prices will be the same whether
landlords are assumed to collude or not.12 Thus, though we describe landlords as being
able to collude, the analysis that follows could just as well have been described by the
assumption of competitive factor markets.
Since each peasant household has (1−θ)T/λ









by simply withdrawing from markets and reverting to autarchy. Thus landlords can never
drive them below this payoﬀ. When landlords can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, (3) will
be the income and utility level of a peasant household in the ￿rst period.
In the second period, however, peasants￿ income will increase, both due to the impact
of ￿rst period tenancy, and also because as a result of land redistribution each household
12As discussed in the next footnote, with a more general production technology, market structure does
matter for determining relative factor prices and income.
10will have more land. In the second period peasant income level is
s(t,h)
ˆ





Landlord income in each period can be expressed as the entire output of the economy,
minus what they have to pay to satisfy the peasant sector￿s reservation utility level. Thus





























Note that, because of constant marginal products, ￿rst period pro￿ts, π1(θ,h) is indepen-
dent of t. Altering the extent of tenancy in the ￿rst period has no eﬀect on ￿rst-period
production because total factor productivity is predetermined in that period.13 However,
given α, π2(t,α,θ,h) is increasing in t.
2.4 Timing of the Game
We shall now calculate the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
￿ Landlords determine the extent of tenancy.
￿ The political parties simultaneously and non-cooperatively determine their plat-
forms.
￿ First period production, consumption and voting take place.
￿ The outcome of the election is determined and land reform is implemented.14
￿ Second period production and consumption take place.
13With a more general production technology, ￿rst-period allocative eﬃciency would be aﬀected since
the suppression of tenancy would in equilibrium lead landlord farms to adopt higher land-to-labor ratios
compared to peasant farms. The size of this distortionary eﬀect will in general depend on the assumed
technology and market structure. Conning (2001) analyzes the consequences of tenancy suppression in a
static general equilibrium model without politics.
14Since the political parties only care about the probability of winning and not the actual policy they
adopt it is weakly optimal for them to actually choose the α they promised. We therefore abstract from
issues of commitment to policy now, but relax this assumption later.
112.5 Analysis
Starting in the second period, we can now use (2) to calculate the equilibrium policy
adopted by the political parties for a given level of tenancy t and other parameters,


































Equation (6) shows that the equilibrium amount of land reform, α(t,θ,h,η),i saw e i g h t e d
function of the marginal eﬀects of land reform on the utilities of the diﬀerent voters. Note
that by the convexity of C, the second order condition is satis￿ed.
For there to be any land reform α > 0 in equilibrium it must be the case that φ
P > φ
L.
This condition requires that the peasant sector have suﬃciently more political clout than
the landlord sector, a condition that is not always likely to be met, even though peasants
are a much larger portion of the electorate.15 In what follows we assume that this
condition is met. Under the simplest median voter model with λ
P ≥ 1
2, ηP =1and
ηL = ηU =0the maximal extent of land reform would result and be determined by
s(t,h)θT = C0(α).










The higher is t the greater the productivity of land in peasant hands and hence the
higher the marginal bene￿t to a peasant from land reform. For a ￿xed political weight,
this greater intensity of preference for reform induces the parties to oﬀer more land redis-
tribution in their platforms. Thus higher tenancy leads to a higher proportion of landlord














The greater is the initial inequality of land, the more a peasant bene￿ts from a given
extent of land reform, and the more reform he wants. This induces more land reform in
15Land reform has often emerged as key electoral issue only following political mobilization of peasant
groups by partisan political parties or outside groups (Kauﬀman, 1972; Lapp, 1997; Tuma, 1965).
12the resulting political equilibrium. Similarly, the greater is the average stock of human
capital, the greater is productivity and the greater the preferred α.A g a i n , t h i s m o v e s
the political equilibrium towards more reform. Also, the higher the land to labor ratio
(captured by T) the greater the per-capita bene￿t from reform for peasants and hence the
desired α. This similarly increases equilibrium α(t,θ,h,η). Finally note that the greater
is φ
U the greater the political weight given to their preferences. Since urban voters prefer
α =0this reduces the extent of land reform oﬀered by the two parties.
For later use it is also useful to consider the eﬀects of changes in θ and h on the
relationship between tenancy and the extent of land reform - on ∂α
∂t. To investigate this































> 0.( 9 )
The signs follow from the previous comparative static results and the assumptions that
sth > 0 and C000 ≤ 0. Expressions (8) and (9) are both intuitive. The ￿r s ts a y st h a tt h e
greater is θ the greater is the marginal eﬀect of tenancy on the extent of land reform. (9)
tells us that an increase in the level of human capital has a similar eﬀects. The important
implication of these derivatives is that they show that when either initial land inequality is
higher, or the labor force is more educated, land reform becomes more sensitive to tenancy
decisions and the organization of agriculture. As we shall see, this tends to increase the
readiness of landlords to alter organization to aﬀect the political equilibrium.
Having solved for both the political determinants of land reform in the second period
and the allocation of resources, it remains to determine the equilibrium amount of tenancy.




By construction, we know that ￿rst-period pro￿ts are independent of t thus the ￿rst-order
condition for this program simply maximizes (5), giving,
st(t,h)
h






≤ 0.( 1 0 )
The ￿rst-order condition clearly shows the trade-oﬀ between the bene￿cial eﬀects of an
increase of tenancy on productivity that the landlord can capture, versus the greater
property rights insecurity eﬀect of higher t increasing α. We assume the second-order
13condition is satis￿ed and denote the interior solution to this equation t(θ,h,η).T h e
implications of (10) are summarized by the following result.
Proposition 1 If the cost of redistributing land is suﬃciently low, then the anticipation
of the impact of agrarian organization on the extent of land reform leads to an ineﬃciently
low level of tenancy so that t(θ,h,η) < 1.
Tenancy is reduced below the socially eﬃcient level in an attempt to reduce the extent
to which agrarian reform is adopted as a policy by the political parties.16 Before consid-
ering the further implications of (10) and Proposition 1 it is important to think about
how our main result generalizes to a higher dimensional policy space. So far we have only
allowed for a single redistributive instrument - land reform. Why not also consider income
redistribution, particularly if land reform has the potential ineﬃciencies we isolate? In
our model, since there is no direct cost to landlords, tenancy would not be deterred by the
prospect of income redistribution in the second period. There are several reasons however
why, despite the availability of income redistribution, we would expect land reform to be
a key redistributive tool (as the evidence suggests that it indeed has been, particularly in
Latin America).
Firstly, few Latin American countries had the bureaucratic capacity to levy regular
income taxes until recently. Thus a once and for all redistribution of assets, despite
its costs, might generate a greater present value income for peasants. Secondly, income
taxation does have costs, the present value of which has to be compared to cost of land
reform. Finally, an important diﬀerence between land and income is that it is hard to
hide land while income can be hidden and moved abroad, making it very hard to tax.
Landlords might be better oﬀ if they could commit to pay income tax since this might
potentially remove the incentive of the peasants to support land redistribution, but they
may not be able to commit ex post not to hide their income.
Condition (10) however leaves open the question of why there is tenancy anywhere.
Why would this eﬀect be more important in Latin America? To attack this question
we consider the comparative statics of (10). Our ￿r s tr e s u l ti st h a tu n d e rp l a u s i b l e
assumptions, greater initial land inequality lowers the extent of tenancy, ceteris paribus.
16As u ﬃcient condition for this proposition is that st(1,h)
h






∂t < 0. This would be satis￿ed if
∂α(1,θ,h,η)
∂t is suﬃciently large which will be true
if C00(α(1,θ,h,η)) is small.
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∂tθT + sθT ∂2α
∂t2 > 0 from the second-order condi-
tion.
Expression (11) shows that when initial land inequality is higher there are several
eﬀects. First, the greater is θ, the greater are the bene￿ts from the increased total
factor productivity that accrue to the landlords, and hence the inclination to choose a
higher t -t h i si st h et e r mst(1 − α)T. On the other hand, three other eﬀects push to
make tenancy increasingly costly for landlords. Firstly, for any level of t,g r e a t e rl a n d
inequality increases the extent of reform (∂α
∂θ > 0) and increases the sensitivity of reform
to t ( ∂2α
∂t∂θ > 0). Finally, higher θ gives landlords more to lose from reform, and this also
induces lower t since ∂α
∂t > 0. Under our assumptions however, the net eﬀect is that:
Proposition 2 The greater is initial land inequality, the lower is the incidence of ten-
ancy.









































st(1 − α) − s∂α
∂t
i
T which follows from (10)
above. From earlier assumptions and results ∂α
∂θ > 0, ∂2α
∂t∂θ > 0, Φ > 0, which lead
to dt
dθ < 0.
This monotonic relationship results under our assumed constant returns to scale pro-
duction technology because under secure property rights full tenancy is the eﬃcient out-
come regardless of initial inequality. Increasing property rights insecurity can therefore
only lead landlords to reduce tenancy relative to this eﬃcient benchmark. Under a
decreasing returns to scale production technology we might instead expect an inverse
U-shaped relation between initial inequality and tenancy. This is because under secure
property rights the tenancy should rise with initial inequality as the lease market reallo-
cates land to reach the eﬃcient determinate pattern of operational farm sizes. At low
to medium levels of land concentration, these allocative eﬃciency considerations would
15dominate so tenancy would rise with inequality, but at higher levels of concentration
the property insecurity eﬀect would rise in importance leading to an emergent inverse
relationship between tenancy and higher initial inequality.
This is our ￿rst explanation of why the incidence of tenancy is so low in Latin America.
T h em o d e ls u g g e s t sa n o t h e re x p l a n a t i o nh o w e v e r .T os e et h i sw en o wi n v e s t i g a t et h ee ﬀect




















Expression (14) shows how diﬀerences in the educational attainment of the labor force
in￿uence landlords￿ optimal trade-oﬀs. Again there are oﬀsetting forces. On the one
hand, when peasants become better educated, they can use land more productively and
this increases the amount of land reform they prefer. These preferences induce the political
parties to adopt platforms oﬀering more reform (∂α
∂h > 0). Moreover, when h is higher,
α is higher for any given level of tenancy ( ∂2α
∂t∂h > 0). A further eﬀect leading to lower
tenancy stems from sh > 0 which increases the marginal loss to the landlords from reform.
However, the ￿rst-term in numerator of (14) pushes towards higher t.T h i si sb e c a u s ei f
human capital h and farming skill from tenancy t are complementary, the higher is the
human capital level of peasants, the greater the opportunity cost of reducing tenancy (in
terms of foregone land rents), and hence other things equal, the greater is t. Therefore, if
sth is suﬃciently strong then we can have the following result.
Proposition 3 If human capital and the productivity gains from tenancy are suﬃciently
complementary, then the higher is the human capital attainment of the labor force, the
greater the extent of tenancy.
Proposition 3 provides further clues as to what might be diﬀerent about Latin America.
Not only has initial land inequality been much greater than in either Europe, North
America or Asia, but rural educational attainment has also lagged considerably. Both
factors may lead the political advantages of reducing tenancy to dominate the productivity
enhancing ones. Such diﬀerences in impact may also help account for elites￿ diﬀerential
willingness to invest in public education across these diﬀerent regions.17
Other factors may determine the extent to which land reform is an important national
political issue. To the extent that it is not, then there is little incentive for landlords to
17Bourguinon and Verdier (2000) discuss elites￿ reluctance to invest in public education for fear that
education will increase the size of the voting population, and Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) document the
empirical relationship in Latin America between land inequality, democratization, and public education.
16organize production defensively. An obvious reason why land reform may not become a
salient political issue would be that the majority of voters were urban, or more generally
that urban voters exert great political power. Intuitively, the greater is the political weight
of the urban sector, the less interested are the majority of voters in land reform and the
less important it becomes necessary to attract the rural vote. This tends to increase
the equilibrium degree of tenancy. We can show this result formally in our model by











In (15) the ￿rst term.18 W et h e r e f o r eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g ;
Proposition 4 The greater is the political weight of the urban sector, the greater is the
equilibrium level of tenancy.
2.6 Extension: Political Cleavages and Agrarian Reform
We now develop a simple extension to capture the idea that the nature of political cleav-
ages may be an important determinant of the extent of land reform oﬀered by political
parties and therefore of the pattern of agrarian organization. As we noted in the intro-
duction, those Latin American countries where we observe a large incidence of tenancy
are also those where redistributive politics evolved into a battle, not between the rich and
the poor, but rather between urban and rural constituencies. We show that if this is the
case then it is likely that the equilibrium extent of land reform will be lower and hence
the incidence of tenancy higher.
There are now two types of urban agents, the poor of mass λ
UP and the rich of mass
λ
UR. The rich have a higher exogenous income endowment of yR and yP,b u ts i n c e
both groups only bear the costs of land reform and get no bene￿ts they prefer α =0 .
Intuitively, when there is a rich versus poor cleavage, peasants and the urban poor form a
coalition. The urban poor do not desire land reform and this tends to reduce α below the
level desired by the peasants. However, when there is an urban versus rural cleavage, the
peasants are in a coalition with the landlords. Since landlords plausibly dislike land reform
much more than the urban poor this leads to a lower equilibrium level of α. This scenario












19The case of Chile, another early urbanized economy, is discussed in the next section.
17To model how cleavages aﬀect the equilibrium level of land reform we extend the model
of the previous section not only by introducing the new urban group, but by also allowing
the political parties to have policy preferences. Rather than simply being interested in
winning power, parties now care directly about the policy they implement. Let Wx(α)
be the utility function of party x. We consider two diﬀerent scenarios and compare the
expected extent of land reform in a political equilibrium. In the case of an urban versus
rural cleavage, party A￿s utility is a function of the utilities of landlords and peasants,
















































We can calculate the preferred policies of the two parties by maximizing these functions.
Clearly, argmaxα WB(α)=0 ,a n dl e tαA =a r gm a x α WA(α).
In the poor versus rich cleavage scenario we instead assume that party A represents
the peasants and the urban poor, while party B represents the landlords and the urban

















B are again the weights attached to diﬀerent groups￿ welfare within the
parties. Clearly, argmaxα WB(α)=0 ,a n dl e tαA =a r gm a x α WA(α).
The timing of the game is as before. However, in the case where parties have policy
preferences the issue of commitment becomes important. We conduct the analysis by
assuming, as in Alesina (1988) and Besley and Coate (1997) that parties cannot make
commitments. This implies that whichever party is elected will then simply choose its
18ideal point as the policy. Anticipating this, voters vote for whichever party￿s ideal point
is closest to their own preferred policy. With these assumptions it is easy to calculate the




















g(0)).( 1 7 )
Thus the expected extent of land reform in these two scenario cases is, χ(αA,0)αA and
χ(αA,0)αA, respectively.
T a k i n gt h ec a s ew h e r eρP
A = ρP
A it is immediate αA > αA. This follows simply from
checking the ￿rst-order conditions for the maximization of WA(α) and W A(α).W i t ht h i s
we can now state the main result of this section,
Proposition 5 Conditional on observing land reform, the extent of land reform is greater
when politics are dominated by poor vs. rich cleavages than when they are dominated
by rural vs. urban cleavages. Moreover, if λ
P is suﬃciently high, then χ(αA,0)αA <
χ(αA,0)αA, so that in addition the expected equilibrium extent of land reform is higher.
Intuitively, although the urban poor dislike land reform they do so much less than
landlords and so when party A f o r m sa l o n gc l a s sl i n e si tp r e f e r sag r e a t e rd e g r e eo fl a n d
reform. However, it does not follow from this that the expected amount of land reform
is higher when αA > αA. This is because a party representing the poor may oﬀering a
platform which is further from the platform oﬀered by the party representing the rich,
than the policy oﬀered by a rural party is from that oﬀered by the urban party. Thus
it could be that the pro-poor party gets elected less often than a pro-rural party, i.e.
χ(αA,0) < χ(αA,0). The condition on the size of λ
P t a k e sc a r eo ft h i sc a s es i n c ec l e a r l y
the poor prefer αA to αA so that λ
P(V P(αA) − V P(αA)) > 0, which tends to increase
χ(αA,0) relative to χ(αA,0). Thus, if the mass of peasants is large enough χ(αA,0)
> χ(αA,0) which is suﬃcient (though not necessary) for the expected extent of land
reform to be higher when there is a poor vs. rich cleavage..
3 Discussion and evidence
A large number of historical studies illustrate the use of defensive patterns of agrarian
organization to protect against the real or perceived threats of property rights challenges.
19In some instances the connection between the form of agrarian organization and the
protection of property rights is patently obvious. For example in El Salvador in the
early eighties thousands of tenants were evicted shortly after it became apparent that
legislation for a land-to-the-tiller agrarian reform was being discussed (Pelupussy, 1996;
Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987). In other instances however, the connection may be
much less apparent, perhaps because the property rights con￿icts are latent. Barrington
Moore (1965) and Scott (1985) are just two classics in a large political and anthropological
literature that explores the actual or latent nature of property rights con￿icts over land,
and their role in shaping political and economic outcomes.
de Janvry (1981) is a classic statement of the ways that land rental and sales markets
have failed to reallocate land toward family farmers in Latin America, and how land reform
processes have been subverted or stopped through the political activities of landlords .
He argues that in several countries the anticipation of land reform landlords expelled
tenants and turned to mechanization and new crops which relied on hired wage labor
rather than tenants (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993). Binswanger, Dieninger, and Feder
(1995) summarize a large body of historical evidence in support both of the stylized fact
that farms which rely primarily on family labor enjoy a productivity advantage over wage-
labor operated farms, and yet that land rental and sale markets have consistently failed
to reallocate labor toward family farms. They detail several instances in Prussia, Latin
America and Southern Africa where the threat of land reform has led landlords to evict
tenants to reduce their exposure to expropriation (p. 2686-88).
Ireland, which did have a land reform, stands out as a very telling exception to the
pattern followed in much of rest of Europe. Landlords￿ property rights were under much
greater threat in Ireland because the vast majority of tenants were Catholic while landlords
were Protestants. Exactly as our analysis would predict, the extent of tenancy declined
markedly as the political con￿ict over land escalated, especially after the 1876 agrarian
crisis and leading up to independence in 1921. This period was marked by a number of
tenancy revolts, evictions, and escalating violence. Limited land reforms where attempted
in a vain eﬀort to stave oﬀ more radical pressures from below (Swinnen, 2000). The area
of land under tenancy declined steadily from over 96 percent in 1879 to 70 percent in
1905, to 42 percent in 1910, to 25 percent in 1923. Following independence, the 1923
Irish Land Act bought out most of the remaining landlords.
The belief that tenancy experience leads to skill accumulation is widespread and has
formed the basis of economic theories of tenancy ladders which date back at least to
Spillman (1919), but empirical evidence is much harder to come by. Attack and Passell
20(1994) summarize the debates on this matter for the United States. de Silva (1999)
provides recent econometric evidence of the signi￿cant diﬀerence in farming skills between
the landless, diﬀerent types of tenants, and owners and reviews the literature. We
should note however that the skill accumulation connection is a convenient channel for
our model, and one that focuses attention on a plausible role for human capital, yet it is
in no way essential to our story. A very similar relationship between agrarian production
organization and the stability of property rights would emerge if landlords were concerned
only about tenants acquiring squatting rights and the possibility of a land-to-the-tiller type
land reform.
The following brief examples from Latin America and Asia further illustrate and
extend discussion of some of the issues raised by the model.
3.1 Colombia
Several scholars have pointed to the mechanism we have studied as an important deter-
minant of tenancy in Colombia. Both Palacios (1979) and Le Grand (1986) argued this in
the context of the Liberal agrarian reform of the early 1930￿s. Zamosc (1986) documents
the evolving relationship between landlords and tenants in Colombia and its role in the
rise of a national peasant movement in the 1970s. The con￿ict over property rights is
illustrated by landlords￿ use of pasture-rent contracts to open up new frontier land in
the north-western regions of the country. Under this system peasants would clear forest
to open up new land in exchange for being allowed to grow rice, yuca, maize or other
food crops. At the end of a few years however tenants were required to sow pastures
and return the land to the landlord. The tenant was typically moved onto a new plot
of land that was fallow or needed to be cleared anew. Furthermore tenants were often
required to live in hamlets on the roadsides between haciendas rather than on the land
they farmed. These practices limited the tenant￿s ability to establish possibly competing
property claims. In terms of our model, the use of short term shifting tenancies allows
landlord to extract some of gain to farming skill accumulation from tenancy (via higher
land rents), yet limits the political threat to their land.
The passage of national legislation 1968 granting potential rights to tenants brought
even this system to an abrupt end. According to Zamosc landlords expelled tenants ￿on
a massive scale, abolishing the customary patterns of access to land within a couple of
years (pp.78-79).￿ These expulsions were a major factor behind the strengthening of the
peasant movement and led to a wave of land invasions.
213.2 El Salvador
Land-scarce El Salvador has long been a place where con￿icts over land have shaped
political outcomes, and vice-versa. Lauria-Santiago (1999) argues that, contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, until the early part of the twentieth century El Salvador was a country
with many smallholders, and relatively un-concentrated land holdings. Rapid population
growth, the closing of the agricultural frontier, the privatization of Indian lands, and the
expansion of coﬀee estates meant however that by the 1920￿s a majority of the predomi-
nantly rural population was without ownership access to land. A large peasant uprising
in 1932 took place in regions where coﬀee estates drew labor from nearby farming com-
munities who felt their livelihoods and landholding status threatened by the downturn
of the depression. The extremely violent suppression of this uprising inaugurated a long
period of authoritarian-oligarchic rule supported by middle and large-scale landowners.20
The more secure property rights of landlords and changing relative prices led to an
initial ￿dramatic￿ rise in tenancy starting in the 1930￿s (Lauria-Santiago, 1999, pp. 234-
235). The political equilibrium held for a few decades but over time came under pressure
as population growth, growing organization and militancy in the countryside and changing
political coalitions in the urban areas and military threatened to place land reform projects
back on the national agenda. Several authors point to the resulting ￿crisis in tenancy and
the role of mid-level landowners in expelling tenants and sharecroppers between the 1950￿s
and 1970￿s, triggering the political crisis that followed (Lauria-Santiago, 1999,p.238)￿21
In 1972 a presidential candidate campaigned on a platform that openly called for
far-reaching agrarian reform. By most accounts the military stole this election and the
candidate was sent into exile. When a reformist Junta came to power in 1979 and
attempted to carry out land reform it met with staunch opposition and organized political
violence from landlords and the more conservative segments of the military. By the early
1980￿s the country had plunged into a full-scale civil war.
Under strong US pressure, land reform was initiated in 1980 in the context of counter-
insurgency operations and to preempt further shift of support toward the leftist guerillas.
A proposed land-to-the-tiller reform led to another wave of tenant expulsions and increased
violence directed against peasants (Pelupessy, 1997). By the early 1990￿s the civil war
20Rural unions had already been banned in 1907 and a National Guard created a few years later with
the express purpose of protecting landlords￿ property rights and insuring labor tranquility. National
guard outposts were billeted to most large estates until the dismantling of the force in 1992.
21Binswanger et al (1995) state that the number of house plots available to colono tenants decreased
from 55,000 to 17,000 in the 1961-70 period. See also Pelupessy (1997).
22had come to a military stalemate. According to Paige (1999) and Wood (2000) resistance
to land reform and political democratization by the country￿s elites lessened as the war
wore on as many landlords had abandoned land to squatters in the rural con￿ict zones
anyway, and been forced to diversify their wealth holdings out of agriculture. By the late
1980￿s members of the economic elite with new interests in banking and urban activities
were able to persuade the ruling right-wing party to peace accords with the guerillas.
Our model points to a complementary explanation for this transition: the war, and
other structural transformations may have also reduced the expected value of land as
an asset in peasant hands, and hence lowered the pressure for, and the support of more
radical land reform. The large scale migration of the rural population to the cities and
to the United States and Canada transformed many former peasants into urban-dwellers
and created an important alternative avenue for economic advancement. In short, the
economy and the costs of war served to lower the potential gain to peasants from further
land asset redistribution just as much as it lowered the potential losses to landowners.
It also moved the median voter from the countryside to the cities. Each of these events
worked to lower the pressure for more radical asset redistributions, allowing both sides of
the con￿ict to move toward the bargaining table.
3.3 Chile
Despite having comparatively high levels of per capita income, urbanization, and edu-
cational attainment, Chile stands out for having retained a rural economy dominated
by traditional large landlord estates until well into the mid-twentieth century. Tenants
within large landlord estates were common, but these were typically long-term labor ser-
vice tenants (inquilinos) who were expected to provide family labor services in exchange
for access to small family plots (Gongora, 1960).
Sadoulet (1992) argues that labor service tenancy in Chile can be understood as an
interlinked contract to overcome credit and asymmetric information problems. Her analy-
sis is suggestive but this theory suggests an increase in the extent of tenancy over time as
tenants acquired the required wealth to lease in ever larger tracts of land. Chile￿s system
of inquilinaje in fact evolved slowly and if anything, the number of sitting tenants declined
rather than expanded in the 20th century. According to de Janvry (1981) the number
of inquilinos peaked in the nineteen thirties and declined steadily thereafter as landlords
began to rely more heavily on hired wage labor. This trend was partly a response to
actual or anticipated legislation designed to protect inquilinos, and growing organization
23in the countryside. Electoral reforms starting in 1958 expanded the size of the rural elec-
torate and reduced landlords￿ opportunities for vote manipulation by establishing secret
balloting. This soon led to new legislation lifting the ban on rural unionization and,
eventually far-reaching agrarian reforms in the 1965-1973 which led to the ￿nal demise of
the large estates and the inquilinaje system.
Given the importance of mining and manufacturing and the size of the urban pop-
ulation in the twentieth century, Chile appears to follow the pattern of Uruguay and
Argentina in having kept land reform oﬀ the national agenda until well into the 1960￿s.
Why then did land reform emerge with so much force when it did? Although the median
voter was not likely a peasant, traditional rural-urban cleavages seem to have temporarily
given way to rich-poor cleavages in shaping the pattern of electoral competition. By
1970 all three principal presidential candidates from left to right had made land reform a
central plank of their programs. The reason appears to be that political parties were ag-
gressively competing for the 25 percent of the electorate that had been released following
the 1958 electoral reforms (Baland and Robinson, 2000). Kaufmann (1970) argues how-
ever that such a transformation in the dynamics of electoral competition were destined
to be short lived as urban workers￿s welfare soon began to be aﬀected by the rising prices
brought about by agricultural disruption and by the increasing claims that the reform
programs placed on scarce government revenues. A military coup in 1973 put an abrupt
end to the redistribution programs and ￿rmly re-established property rights security. By
then however the large landlord estates had been destroyed. Land rental markets in Chile
today are very active by Latin American standards.
3.4 Korea
Jeon and Kim (2000) oﬀer an interesting account of the process of land redistribution
in Korea that illustrates the important political role of tenants. Tenancy under the
Japanese colonial administration 1919-45 had been high: in 1939 over 58 percent of farm-
land was under tenancy and 56 percent of farmer households were tenants. Although
tenant protests demanding lower rents were not uncommon under Japanese colonial rule,
the Japanese military presence strictly enforced landlord￿s property rights. Landlord po-
litical power was very seriously and quickly eroded however when the Japanese were forced
to abandon the Korean peninsula and Korea came under the US military administration
in August 1945 however.
Both the US military administration and the ￿rst democratically elected administra-
24tion in 1948 signaled a ￿rm willingness to implement land reform legislation. The North
Korean threat helped to remove the remaining political impediments and land reform
legislation was passed in 1950. Although the reforms had the appearance of being exter-
nally imposed, Jeon and Kim point out that the 1948 land reform should be understood
as ￿an endogenously determined governmental policy consistent with the intuition of the
median voter theorem ... [as] tenants represented the largest portion of the population
(pp. 257-258).￿ In fact, the eﬀects of the anticipation of land reform were felt as soon
as the Japanese withdrew, years before ￿nal reforms were enacted in 1950. During this
period the tenancy market ￿broke down￿ as tenants collectively refused to pay rents. The
eventuality of reform became so certain however that 60 percent of landlords ￿ mostly the
larger ones ￿ sold their land to tenants via the market at reduced prices before 1950. In
fact more than twice as much land was sold by landlords in anticipation of the reform than
was ever transferred directly via the land reform law (p. 255, Table 1). Jeon and Kim
conclude their analysis by arguing econometrically that land reform increased agricultural
productivity by enhancing economic incentives.22
4C o n c l u s i o n
The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment
determines organizational form under the assumption of exogenous property rights to
land. The political economy literature has modelled the endogenous determination of
property rights and the distribution of land ownership. In this paper we have argued that
the form of agrarian organization may also be in￿uenced by the anticipation of property
rights challenges. In particular, we argued that landowners may have an incentive to limit
the extent of tenancy to reduce the expected extent of land redistribution. Despite the
economic advantages that tenancy embodies, by giving tenants de facto property rights
or increasing their skills, it also raises the desired extent of land reforms via the political
process.
Though the economic environment undoubtedly plays an important role in agrarian
organization, we argued that our theory provides an important key to why there seems to
be so little tenancy in situations where agrarian reform is a salient political issue, particu-
larly in Latin America. Our prediction that initial asset inequality can slow growth via its
impact on private agents￿ decisions to alter production organization to protect property
22They argue that since much of the land under tenancy had previously been sharecropped, the transfer
of ownership rights removed a classic Marshallian ineﬃciency.
25rights is supported by recent evidence and accounts, including Keefer and Knack￿s (2000)
cross-country econometric ￿ndings that inequality reduces growth primarily via its eﬀect
on property rights security rather than through several of the other channels hypothesized
in the literature.
There is an important implication of our model. Interestingly, the very success of
agrarian reform seems intimately tied to pre-reform agrarian organization. Because the
extent of tenancy was high, land reform bene￿ciaries in East Asia had already acquired
farming skills and management experience which meant that production was not sub-
stantially disrupted by the transfer of property rights. Land reform in these countries
is deemed to have been highly successful both at raising agricultural productivity and
at releasing labor into the newly expanding sectors that formed the basis of East Asia￿s
economic miracle (Dore, 1959; Tuma, 1965).23 In most countries of Latin America where
land reform has taken place land was often transferred to landless farm laborers or labor
service tenants with much less practical experience as independent producers and with low
educational attainment. Not surprisingly, land reform was initially far more disruptive
to production, and has ultimately been less successful at raising agricultural productivity
and incomes. Our theory thus helps to account for, not just the relative incidence of dif-
ferent forms of agrarian organization, but also the eﬀects of a transfer of property rights
on the eﬃciency of the rural economy.24
23Both Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (1996) and Besley and Burgess (2000) present evidence of positive
impacts of tenancy and agrarian reforms in West Bengal and India, but these instances fall far short of
the mass redistributive changes seen in East Asia or attempted in Latin America.
24Though we did not model this phenomenon formally it would be easy to extend the model to capture
it. Intuitively, land reform induces costs because individuals have to develop speci￿c productive skills and
undertake tasks which are new to them. When agents with little experience are given land output falls
while they develop such skills. However, the extent to which they already have such skills is a function
of the extent of tenancy in the ￿rst period. Thus tenancy mitigates the ￿disorganization￿ caused by land
redistribution. To capture this we could allow s to be decreasing in α hence, s(t,h,α) and sα < 0 but with
sαt > 0. Such a formulation adds an extra cost to land redistribution so the details of the expressions
change but the interesting new result would be that the initial extent of tenancy could be the diﬀerence
between land reforms where agricultural output rise or falls after reform.
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30Table 1: Distribution of farmland by land tenure status, 1970 World Census of Agriculture 





Number of Countries   10 4 15 12 2 46
Number of Farms (millions)  93.3 3.5 8.6 11.9 3.1 120.4
Avg. operational farm size (ha)  2.3 0.5 46.5 7.6 161.2 10.0
Percent of farmland under:             
Pure owner Cultivation  84.0 9.2 80.4 58.9 36.6 61.1
Pure Tenancy  5.9 3.0 6.2 12.5 11.9 9.0
Owner-cum-Tenancy 10.1 29.1 5.6 28.5 51.5 27.2
Communal or other  0.0 58.7 7.8 0.1 0.0 2.7
Source:  Adapted from Table 1.1. in Hayami and Otsuka (1993) The Economics of Contract Choice, 
Oxford.  
Notes: Farmland under owner-cum-tenancy includes both owned and leased land. Asia: Bahrain, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore. Africa: Cameroon, 
Reunion, Swaziland; Latin America: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guadeloupe, Honduras, 
Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, Virgin Islands, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden, UK; North America: Canada, USA. Table 2: Land Ginis and area cultivated by tenure status in selected countries 








ASIA             
Bangladesh 1976 0.42  -  20.9 
India 1970 0.62  2.4  8.5 
Indonesia 1973 0.56  2.1  23.6 
Philippines 1971 0.51  21.4  32.8 
Thailand 1978 0.45  6  15.5 
Taiwan 1939 -    56.3
 
 1959 -    14.4 
Korea 1939 -  -  58.4 
 1955 0.34    0.5 
Japan 1941 0.42    45.8 
      
EUROPE             
Belgium 1880 -    64.0 
 1990 -    67.0 
Ireland 1870 -    96.0 
 1990 0.62    6.0 
France 1880 -    40.0 
 1990 0.54    57.0 
UNITED  STATES    
 1969    40.0 
   1997 0.73    49.0 
LATIN AMERICA            
Argentina 1960 0.79  14.6   
Brazil 1970 0.84  6.1  10.2 
Bolivia 1950 0.94  7.5   
Costa Rica  1973 0.82  1.2  9 
Chile 1965 0.94  14.2  24.4 
Colombia 1960 0.86  5.3  11.5 
El Salvador  1961 0.81  7.8  
Nicaragua 1963 -  2.6   
Peru 1961 0.91  4.5  13.6 
Uruguay 1970 0.82  19.1  46.3 
Venezuela 1961 0.91  4.5  2.4 
Notes: Non-italics numbers in the Tenancy Total column indicate the fraction of cultivated land under pure 
tenancy or owner-cum-tenancy (i.e. the data do not distinguish between leased and owned land in the 
owner-cum-tenancy subcategory).  Italicized figures report only the fraction of cultivated land actually 
under tenancy (i.e. not counting owned land in the owner-cum-tenant subcategory). 
Sources: Asian country data except for Taiwan and Korea from Table 1.2 in Hayami and Otsuka (1993); 
Taiwan: Fei, Ranis & Kuo (1979).  Korea: Jeon and Kim (2000), Table A1; Japan: Tuma (1965), Table 
23. Europe: Swinnen (2000), various tables.  Latin America and 1969 data for United States: Wilkie, J. 
(ed.) (1996), Tables 200, 201, 206.  United States: 1997 Census of Agriculture. Land Ginis for USA, 
Ireland, and France from Deininger and Olinto (2000), Table 2. 